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Appendix 5

Captured Japanese Aerial Photography

- 1. The dates on the Captured Japanese Aerial Photography available through the Central Film Library, Air AG, are confined to the early 1930's.

 It seemed improbable that the Japanese had no other recommaissance photography taken during the 1940's over China, Manchuria and eastern Siberia.

 Persistent questioning of agencies that should know revealed no trace of later photography in the Washington area. It did reveal a widespread feeling that there must be some in existence. Inquiry with persons recently returned from Japan revealed that the photography does exist and that it is being used by several units operating with the Occupation Forces but no one knew exactly who was holding the material, its date and extent.

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- 2. A conference was held with

 the importance of retrieving this photography for use by CIA and other

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 interested agencies in Washington. The decision was reached that it was

 strongly advisable that

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It would be highly bene25X1A9a
ficial, particularly to CIA, to have locate and determine the
scope of this potent source of information from an area where we are so
lacking in direct evidence. GR/OCD has been made aware of our interest in
these photographs and the advisebility of investigating the
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situation for CIA.

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3. A second set of conferences were arranged by
with personnel in SO. First contact was made with
whom I discussed the
need for the photography and possibility of it being in Japan. He
was most cooperative and understanding. At his suggestion, we visited
Col._____, recently associated with G-2, FECOM. The Colonal
knew definitely that the photography as being used in FECOM and FE/F
among others in Japan and that everyone supposed that a set of prints
from the negatives had been shipped to Washington.

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It is hoped that the combined efforts of

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about the Captured Japanese Aerial Photography so appropriate action may be initiated by OCD to bring to Washington the required prints or duplicate negatives at the earliest possible date. In case there is a large mass of material such as was the case in Germany it might be expedient to have copies of the lot maps flown to Washington so the Graphic Research Coordination Group can establish priority for the duplication in the field of the various areas covered.

REQUEERDATING

On the basis of my brief study of the situation in CIA, I make the following recommendations:

1. That ORR have on its staff a skilled photo interpreter fully aware of the photo intelligence potential of the material now available to ORR, OCI, and OSI analysts. For this position, I recommend to you without reservation

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2. That it would be most useful to the analysts in TR and other offices of CIA to have available a small team of photo interpreture with the standard P.I. equipment to work directly with the analysts at their desks. Such a group could be slowly accumulated as the appropriate persons are located. At this time it seems that not more than three photo interpreture are needed. I/Air could effectively use a photo interpreture continuously for about four months at this time. I am sure other units could do likewise.

If areas now closed to us are opened, there will be a much greater need and the suggested three night well serve as a pilot operation to work out the techniques of coordinating intelligence on an all-source basis. Such a group of interpreters should have a close liaison with Graphics Register, OCD, where much of the material is available and unused.

3. That the current aerial photography over North Korea be utilised for ORR evaluation of the economic potential of that area by the employment of selected Army and Air Force Photo Interpretation Teams, Reserve, as an external research project.

Approved For Release 2000/08/2 A-RDP75-00662R00020

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Accompanied by of the Graphics Register, I

spent the morning with the Photo Interpretation Unit of the Reconnaissance Branch, Director/of Intelligence, US Air Force. There I discussed the CIA requirements for photo interpretation with Colonel Setchel, Major Mayuga, and Mr. Tate. This organization is eager to continue supplying routine or special photo interpretation reports to CIA. These reports are just that -- photo interpretation -- they do not propose a synthesis of photo-interpretation and other intelligence to be photo intelligence reports where considerable part of the final production. At present the high Air Force priority projects are increasing in number to such an extent that it is quite possible that in the near future this Unit will be unable to supply CIA with prompt service. Their To has been frozen, and it appears unlikely that they will be allowed further personnel. The US Army has assisted them by detailing to the Unit two Army PI's to assist in the general work of interpretation, and thus relieve some of the pressure due to Army requirements. I believe that a similar arrangement whereby either actual photo interpretations belonging

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to CIA are detached for duty with this Unit, or CIA funds allotted to the Unit to pay for additional photo interpreters would enhance our relationships with the photo interpreters in the Director/of Intelligence. Air Force. During the discussions it was brought out that at present the flow of material from FEAF is so great, and Air Force interest in it so little, that nothing is being done with this photography, much of it covering strategic installations in the northern part of North Korea and possibly, at times, showing areas outside the boundaries of that country. At present all of material, this/not worked and with the accompanying reports not distributed, being is/stored in the Pentagon under the care of the Air Adjutant General, where it is held for ninety days. At the end of that time, this valuable source of information is destroyed. It may be that a scanning of the material by GR/CD might yeild to CIA important information.

Probably the most disastrous news learned this morning is that the SAC is urging the return to continental United States of the

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three RB-45's, the only aircraft in FEAF capable of adequate penetration of those areas within the Soviet sphere of interest to us. The PI Unit that I visited is registering a non-concurrence for the return of these aircraft, and I am sure that the same action should be taken by CIA. It is through the employment of these aircraft that the interesting photography of Sakhalin was procured. Without these aircraft in the field, it would be impossible to follow these developments and to search out others. For this purpose alone, I believe it worthwhile to recommend holding the aircraft in the FEAF area.

The afternoon of I April I spent practically the entire afternoon discussing the proper utilization of aerial photos of any vintage with the six or seven analysts in I/Air. These young gentlemen are fully aware of the potential that lies in aerial photography.

They are using allawailable photo interpretation reports in the valuable photography accompanying these reports. They badly need

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a training that could be done on the job which would make it

possible for them to get more information from the photographs

and to more intelligently use the photographs in conjunction with

correlary information from other sources. Mr. Deverall is fully

cognizant of the importance of aerial photographies as intelligence

documents, and I am sure would favor any action that would increase

the efficiency of his staff or make available to them skilled

assistance in utilizing aerial photographs of all vintages.

What was the problem?.

Low belgan help?

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good example for final report?